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PUBLIC OVERSIGHT OF
PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
PROFESSOR BRIFFAULT: This is the panel in which we begin
to look more directly at some of the mechanisms for accountability
and monitoring, a central theme of the entire Symposium. The
panelists will be talking about such issues as the role of the courts,
litigation, government agencies, monitoring procedures, community organizations, advocacy groups, and public interest lawyering
in providing monitoring and accountability for the new organizations and hybrid organizations that are center stage in the era of
privatization. These include private, quasi-private, and mixed public/private entities. These various sorts of line-blurring organizations are playing a much greater role in providing services that in
recent decades had been considered public services.
Our five panelists are Jack Beermann, Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law, where his primary teaching and research interests have been civil rights litigation and administrative
law; Barbara Bezdek, Associate Professor of Law at the University
of Maryland School of Law, where she teaches in the legal theory
and practice curriculum; Wayne Hawley, Deputy Counsel to the
New York City Conflicts of Interest Board, who advises city employees on the city's ethics laws, and brings a government perspective to this panel and to this conference; Susan Sturm, who teaches
at Columbia Law School after a very distinguished career at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, and specializes in issues
relating to race and gender in the work place, employment discrimination, and remedies; and Louise Trubek, Clinical Director and
Senior Attorney at the Center for Public Representation at the
University of Wisconsin Law School, where her work emphasizes
such issues as telecommunications and access to justice.
Professor Beermann?

PROFESSOR BEERMANN: Thank you very much. I was
asked to be on this panel, I think, to give an overview of the issues
of political accountability and privatization. I do not profess to
know very much about particular privatizations, so I am going to
be general, out of necessity.
In reading the legal literature on privatization, there are two different types of articles that interested me. One type discusses the
kinds of legal or constitutional constraints there are on privatization, and, as part of the analysis, discusses the fact that there really
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are not any direct legal constraints on privatization.' The other
type describes a particular kind of privatization and bemoans its
failures, the problems it causes, and the lack of adequate checks on
private governance. 2
In my paper for this Symposium, I speculate on constitutional
limits that courts might place on privatization within the context of
what limits already exist,3 and what limits may be possible.4 I also
look at the different kinds of privatization, with an eye toward
modeling the way in which political accountability is affected by
different kinds of privatization.
One of the big issues of privatization is the question of political
accountability: Will the privatized entity or cooperative entity be
less accountable through the political process?
I think it is important always to separate the market accountability question from the political accountability question, because the
two kinds of accountability are radically different. I will talk about
that a little bit later.
The first thing then, is to define "political accountability." I define political accountability very simply as amenability of an action
or activity to monitoring and control through the political process. 5
That is a circular definition, I know, but it includes the clarification
of lines of responsibility, that is, who is responsible and to whom
one goes to try to change a particular action. Also, it addresses
more specifically the ability to get information, the applicability of
legislation like the Freedom of Information Act, 6 and administrative, procedural constraints on accountability.
Now, I tend to be somewhat of a pessimist when analyzing legal
institutions, and so it is tempting for me to look at this issue
through a "public choice" lens7 and question whether public sector
1. Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV.
449, 455-56, 480 (1988) ("While privatization presents many legal issues, it does not
confront serious legal constraints other than process requirements."); Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan 1II, ConstitutionalLimits on Privatization,46 AM. J. COMP. L.
481, 481-82 (Supp. 1998) (discussing the "paucity" of constitutional limits on
privatization).
2. E.g., Joseph E. Field, Note, Making Prisons Private:An Improper Delegation
of a Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649 (1987).
3. For the limits that already exist, see Cass, supra note 1, at 455-56, 480.
4. Professor Beermann's discussion is based upon an article, appearing in its entirety, infra, this volume of the Fordham Urban Law Journal. Jack M. Beermann,
Privatizationand Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507 (2001).
5. Id.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2001).
7. By a "public choice" lens, I mean explanations of government regulation that
focus more on the political forces that are arrayed concerning the regulation rather
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resistance to privatization is explained by fear on the part of government officials of losing the power they get through patronage
and through all the other sorts of things that make government
inefficient. There are many discussions from a public choice perspective about why government is so inefficient,8 and about patronage problems and the aspirations of government officials
toward profitable work in the private sector.9 These things combine to make it unrealistic, according to public choice theorists, to
expect that government will ever do anything well.
However, it is risky to rely on public choice criticisms of government to argue for privatization because under public choice assumptions, we should assume that the same distortions in the
political process that make much government regulation inefficient
will affect the decision whether and how to privatize. This is because it is government officials who decide whether and how to
privatize. Public choice analysis would assume that they will privatize only when it is in their interests to do so, 10 i.e., when the gains

to the government officials from privatization (in terms of political
or economic support from beneficiaries of privatization) outweigh
any losses to the officials, perhaps in reduced support from organized labor and reduced control over patronage appointments to
government positions.
There is also this notion that when something is privatized, the
government official is hoping to get some sort of campaign support
or a good job after government service. This is a very common
problem with the public sector, the movement from government to
the private sector in which regulators obtain lucrative employment
from the groups they formerly regulated. In wondering why reguthan the public interest explanations that government typically offers for regulation.
See Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148-57
(1977) (describing public interest and public choice models of understanding government regulation).
8. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991).
9. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separationof Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633,
709 (2000) (discussing the problem of government employees "selling out" the administration's program to maximize their own post-government employment
opportunities).
10. See Paul B. Stephan III, Toward a Positive Theory of Privatization-Lessons
from Soviet-Type Economies, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 173 (1996) (arguing that in
post-Soviet-type economies, privatization may result from rent-seeking behavior by
government officials). Stephan appears to assume that privatization in a democratic
country like the United States is not rent-seeking because of the "transparency" of
the political process. Id. at 184. The basis for this optimistic assumption is unclear.
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lators treat regulated industries so well, it is because otherwise they
would never get those lucrative jobs after their government service.
Therefore, because the government decisions to privatize are
likely to be made for the same reasons that the public choice movement cites to criticize government generally, the case for privatization cannot be made by simply pointing out all the problems that
government has in acting efficiently and effectively. It is important
to look at each privatization proposal on its own merits, and perhaps hope for the best.
So assume for the sake of discussion that there is less-or less
clear-accountability when you have a privatized activity, in very
general terms, than when an activity is within government. The
question that I have is whether this raises a constitutional question.
In other words, does the Constitution require clear lines of political
accountability and does the Constitution require that government
activity be amenable to control through the political process?
There is some state law that very directly addresses this question.1" There is even one state, at least, that has an accountability
clause in its constitution, requiring that the government activity re12
main accountable.
However, I am going to focus more on federal law, because that
is what I know more about. There are some possible federal constraints on privatization, such as the Appointments Clause of the
Constitution, 3 which requires that only properly appointed officers
of the United States may exercise the power of the United States
government.' 4 And appointments, obviously, are political, so there
is a very direct political control there on government activity.
There is also the presidential removal power15 -- or, at least, executive branch removal power 16-an implied limitation on the
structure of government recognized by the Supreme Court, stating
that to completely shield people exercising government power
from removal within the executive branch would at some level violate separation of powers. 7
11. E.g., Julie Huston Vallarelli, Note, State ConstitutionalRestraintson the Privatization of Education, 72 B.U. L. REv. 381, 393 (1992).
12. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. V. (discussed in Vallarelli, supra note 11, at 393).
13. U.S. CONST. Art. 1I, § 2, cl. 2.
14. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125-26 (1975).
15. See generally Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (approving congressional restrictions on the President's removal of a Federal Trade
Commissioner).
16. E.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (approving assignment of power
to remove special prosecutor to the Attorney General of the United States).
17. Id. at 695-97.
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There is also the nondelegation doctrine,18 which might disallow
discretionary decision-making by private groups. 19 Since no statute
has been invalidated by the Supreme Court on nondelegation
grounds since 1936, some relatively moribund precedents would
have to be revived, but the potential is there in old cases like Carter
Coal.2° At the state level, there may be some Guarantee Clause
issues, 21 although that is an unenforced constitutional norm. You
could imagine a situation in which the state tried to have, for example, a private police force or private administrative agency. These
might be held to violate some sort of a Guarantee Clause norm,
that the guarantee of a "Republican Form of Government" requires that certain government functions, such as these, be carried
out by actual government officials.
There is also the constraint of liability. That is, privatized groups
such as private prisons, for example, often are treated just as if they
are government, and so they are held to the due process 22 and cruel
and unusual punishment norms 23 to which government prisons are
held. And they are even worse off because, according to the Supreme Court, their officials are not entitled to the immunities that
government employed officials would have.24 So there is that kind
of constraint.
But I am thinking that maybe we could imagine a pure accountability doctrine, a pure doctrine looking at the political accountability of something and finding that if it is a government entity that is
not sufficiently politically accountable, it will be struck down, held
unconstitutional, or be constitutionally regulated on those grounds.
I think that the way in which anticommandeering norms under
current Tenth Amendment doctrine 25 developed parallel the manner in which an accountability based limitation on privatization
18. The nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from delegating its legislative
power. E.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
19. The nondelegation doctrine has been applied most strongly when Congress
delegates legislative power to private individuals or groups. E.g., Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
20. See generally Carter,298 U.S. 238.
21. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
22. See Warren L. Ratliff, The Due Process Failure of America's Prison Privatization Statutes, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371, 398-99 (1997) (discussing the application
of due process requirements to private prisons).
23. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988).
24. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
25. Under current Tenth Amendment doctrine, the federal government may not
require state and local government entities or officials to carry out a federal regulatory program. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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might develop. At one time, there were specific limitations on federal regulation of the states under National League of Cities v.
Usery.2 6 In fact, there was a test that federal law had to pass to
avoid being struck down as violating the Tenth Amendment. 7
Justice O'Connor's dissent, written when she first joined the
Court, stated that the problem was not about the regulation of
states as states. Rather, she maintained that the lines of accountability between the federal and state government are too blurred
when the federal government compels state agencies to act. 28 So
she pushed for a new doctrine.29
When the Supreme Court decided to abandon its general scrutiny of the federal regulation of states, Justice O'Connor's accountability doctrine bore fruit as the new Tenth Amendment doctrine,3 °
which does not allow the federal government to commandeer state
government entities. 31 Therefore, it is possible to imagine a doctrine springing from nowhere, the same way that that an equal protection norm to regulate ballot-counting procedures did in the
recent presidential election.32 At least the accountability doctrine I
discuss springs from the normative basis of the Tenth Amendment
doctrine.
In my last two minutes, I would like to discuss the topic addressed in the second type of legal literature on privatization-the
success or failure of different kinds of privatization. In an article a
while back, Ron Cass, my Dean, categorized privatizations as divided up into divestiture, ccontracting out, deregulation, vouchers,
26. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
27. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982) (suggesting that Congress would
be violating the Tenth Amendment by passing a law "'directly compelling' the States
to enact a legislative program").
28. Id. at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
29. O'Connor agreed with the majority that Congress' enactment of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"), Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(codified in scattered section of the U.S. Code), was supported by the Commerce
Clause, but rejected the Tenth Amendment analysis employed by the majority. Id.

O'Connor argued that "Titles I and III of the PURPA conscript state utility commissions into the national bureaucratic army," which violates the principles of National
League of Cities and was "antithetical to the values of federalism, and inconsistent
with our constitutional history." Id.
30. The Supreme Court overruled National League in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985). Several years later, the Court
adopted Justice O'Connor's anti-commandeering principle in both New York, 505
U.S. 144, and Printz, 591 U.S. 898.
31. See generally New York, 505 U.S. 144; Printz, 591 U.S. 898.
32. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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tax reduction, and user fees. 33 In my paper, I talk about the importance of looking at each of the categories and then different kinds
of privatization within these categories to understand the political
accountability problems.
It is important to define "contracting out." Contracting out is
when a government contracts with a private entity to provide
goods or services either to or on behalf of government. There are
several different kinds of contracting out. Nobody finds it problematic that the government does not make its own paper clips.
But people do think it is a problem that the government contracts
out for prisons or schools, because of accountability concerns.
The biggest opponent of privatization is organized labor,3 4 which
argues that government saves money through privatization only at
labor's expense.35
It is possible to propose that labor actually created the accountability problem-the one present before privatization is introduced-because government provides more protection to
organized labor than to the private sector.36 Therefore, it could be
argued that privatization increases accountability because the government agency monitoring the contracted out activity will bear
more direct responsibility.
Interestingly, the warden of the state prison from which a group
of inmates in Texas recently escaped was demoted after the escape.37 This government administrator, who apparently failed in
33. Cass, supra note 1.
34. E.g., Editorial, Charter Amendment is Ill Advised, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Nov. 3, 2000, at 22 ("Moreover, this amendment would be a regrettable precedent. It
is a brainchild of organized labor, which hates the privatization of public jobs.");
Brian C. Mooney, DeNucci May Bar $305m Bus Deal, BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 1997,
at B3 ("Privatization, a watchword of Governor William F. Weld's administration and
a political battle cry for organized labor, faces a crucial test today.").
35. Business Briefs, Welfare Issue Could Mean Major Job Losses, DALLAS MORNINO NEWS, Apr. 29, 1997, at 1B ("Organized labor is opposing the Texas privatization
plan-which has been stalled at the White House for four weeks-in large measure
because of concern that good-paying public sector jobs will vanish.").
36. Government workers have due process and civil service protections that do
not apply to private sector labor. Thus, it may be more difficult for managers to control them than their private counterparts. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399,
410-11 (1997) (stating that civil service rules "may limit the incentives or the ability of
individual departments or supervisors flexibly to reward, or to punish, individual
employees").
37. Darren Barbee & Melody McDonald, Four Prison Escapees Capturedin Colorado, 1 Fugitive Kills Himself, Search Continuesfor 2 Others, TV Show Segment Leads
to Tip on Location of Men, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 23, 2001, at 1 ("After a long investigation, state prison officials reduced pay to Senior Warden Timothy
B. Keith and reassigned him to a group that monitors private prison contracts.").
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his duties to provide direct government services, was made part of
the state bureaucracy that monitors the private prisons in Texas.
Perhaps this shows the importance the Texas government places on
monitoring private prisons.
I have no time left, but I just want to mention one more thing.
In addition to questions regarding the reach of the Administrative
Procedure Act 3 8 and Freedom of Information Act, 39 one additional

issue discussed in my paper is accountability of government corporations. There are many government corporations such as Fannie
Mae40 and Ginnie Mae, 4 ' parts of the Federal Reserve System,42
and the corporation that is going to give all the federal money to
faith-based organizations. 43 These corporate structures are, arguably, the most opaque in terms of accountability.
This topic has been addressed, 44 but we should pay closer attention to the massive amount of federal money doled out to government corporations whose boards of directors are selected by the
very people who are being regulated. 45 Further, it is very unclear
to whom one would go in the federal government to influence the
activities and decisions of these corporations.46 I think that issue
needs to be discussed. Thank you.
PROFESSOR BRIFFAULT: Next is Professor Bezdek.
PROFESSOR BEZDEK: Good morning.
My paper addresses local government contracts for welfare-towork services, and I have subtitled it Non-Accountability and Diminished Democracy in Local Government Contracts For Welfareto-Work Services.47
38. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
39. Id. § 552.
40. See Beermann, supra note 4.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Exec. Order No. 13199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 31, 2001); Editorial, The Amen
Corner, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2001, at A20.
44. E.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation,1995 U.
ILL. L. REV. 543 (arguing that some federal corporations operate under a legal regime
that allows them to escape accountability to Congress, the President, and the private
market, and that, because of this, their private investors, shareholders, and managers
may benefit more than the public they are supposed to serve).
45. Beermann, supra note 4.
46. Id.
47. Professor Bezdek's discussion is based upon an article, appearing in its entirety, infra this volume of the Fordham Urban Law Journal.Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Deomcracy in Local
Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559
(2001).
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I will begin with a very brief tour of the recent history of welfare
reform. The welfare state of the mid-twentieth century has been
supplanted by the rise of the contractual state.48 Welfare reform in
the United States also is mired in the worldwide reinvention of
government, the devolution revolution.4 9 It is particularly important to note that the 1996 Act that we think of as welfare reform in
this country, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act,5 ° devolved significant control over welfare policy from the federal government to the states.5' Many states then
further devolved the actual implementation of this enormous policy revolution to their county, and even city, levels, which then contract it to other vendors for the actual implementation of welfareto-work services.52
As this devolution revolution plays out in the administration of
public welfare benefits, it is much more difficult for citizens not
only to get benefits, but also for the public to hold the new regime
accountable. This is significant, in part, because the decisions by
government agents that most determine whether welfare reform
works for the people who need to move from welfare to work are
largely insulated from public input and judicial review.53
I have attempted to look at one city's contracts with private vendors for the provision of welfare-to-work services. I did so both to
examine the apparent system set in place, by looking at the requests for proposals5 4-what it is that the local government people
intended to accomplish-and then to read the contracts and to talk
with people involved with that system to discern how well the program is working.
As a background, the Act requires that parents receiving assistance go to work,55 a lifetime cap of sixty months on the ability to
receive public assistance, 56 and that states be rewarded by the re48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
("PRWORA"), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2279 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C).
51. Id.
52. Bezdek, supra note 47.
53. Id.
54. Id. (discussing Baltimore's localism regime).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2001). Parents not working must engage in approved community service after they have been on the assistance roll for two months.
Id. § 602(a)(1)(B)(iv).
56. Id. § 608(a)(7)(A).
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ceipt of federal money as long as the state gets enough of its
caseload involved to meet the state's work participation rates. 7
Thus, there is a system in the Act for accountable work activities58 that enables the state to get its federal dollars, which may or
may not bear a relationship to whether the person who is moving
from the welfare caseload into some work setting is actually being
led to employment. Instead, they may be spending their sixtymonth, lifetime limit in some kind of nonemployment limbo, because countable work activities include many things which sound
worthy, but which may or may not lead to employment: adult basic
education, and English as a second language, of course; job readiness activities; job search; job skills training, which may not lead to
a job; on-the-job training, which may not include a requirement
that the person who successfully completes the training is in fact
59
employed by the employer at the end of that training.
So there is a risk that the public agency is actually directing
TANF ("Temporary Assistance for Needy Families") 60 recipients
to work activities that count toward the state's requirements under
federal law, but do not in fact help parents find employment and
support their families. 6 This makes it imperative to examine not
only the policies, practices, and, indeed, the objectives of the government actor as it spends the state's welfare block grant, but also
62
how those policies affect the recipient's lifetime limit.
My paper analyzes both the accountability problem presented
here-the duty of public officials and managers to explain or justify
their actions-and the duty to provide a remedy for people harmed
by failures in that system. The paper also examines administrative
efficacy-what administrators are doing to make the system work.
For example, the contracts in Baltimore are, as in many places,
ordinary procurement contracts. 63 Be aware that the administrative acts and public information laws generally do not apply to pri57. Id. § 607(a)(1) (setting "minimum participation rates" of twenty-five percent
in 1997, rising to fifty percent by 2002, for single-parent families); id. § 607(a)(2) (setting the "minimum participation rate" for two-parent families at seventy-five percent
for 1997 and ninety percent by 2002).
58. PRWORA replaced the old AFDC program with Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families ("TANF"), and abolished any entitlement to assistance by any individual or family under any state program so funded. Id. § 601(b).
59. Bezdek, supra note 47.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 601(b).
61. Bezdek, supra note 47.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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vate contractors. 64 Rules governing public procurement are
principally directed to protect the integrity of the competitive process. They have never been designed to solicit public input in creating the policy. They do not ask to what jobs the program is
leading people, or what the indicators are that training in these
welfare-to-work vendor contracts actually increases employment
levels. Procurement procedures generally fail as a vehicle for public participation in the development of contract specifications, the
selection of contractors, or the enforcement of contract terms.
The public, no doubt, is aware of concerns that have been raised
in many states and cities, including this one, about procurement
processes, whether or not they actually encourage cronyism of
some kind. Similar concerns have been raised in Milwaukee.65
For example, in Washington, D.C., there was an audit that identified fifty million dollars in welfare-to-work job-training contracts
that were awarded illegally in 1999.66 Part of the critique of that
system was that the agency employees actually wrote unduly vague
requests for services and then failed to follow up to ensure that
vendors had performed that which was promised. It is important
to consider the availability of taxpayer suits in one's locality to address problems of that kind.
A section of my paper will speak to the problem that welfare
recipients in a place like Baltimore City encounter, and this section
is entitled "The Devil's In the Details. ' 67 Concentrated poverty is
the context for much of contract welfare. 68 Baltimore City certainly well illustrates this fact.
The premise of the welfare reform statute was that the individual
was a welfare recipient and should now become a worker, and
freely chooses between deviant dependency and joining the work
force. So some truth exists to the notion that any individual welfare parent faces not only her own constraints about succeeding in
the job market, but also many things that are outside of her personal control: infrastructural matters, such as the labor market opportunities, job availability, potential wage rates, the availability of
work support systems like day care and transit.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Welfare caseloads have become predominantly urban in this
country in the last half of the 1990s. 69 Even currently, during the
most sustained economic boom in U.S. history, four out of five
American cities have not staged a comeback in job growth, and
certainly not relative to their suburbs. 70 Therefore, we face a further dilemma about the complexity of the task in which we have
asked local departments of social services to engage: the geographic boundedness of the programs that they are administering.
There are, of course, county and local programs trying to serve a
county caseload or a state caseload in order to keep the federal
money stream flowing. The market of job opportunities, however,
is not so bounded.
Much of my paper will address my particular locality, the case
study in Baltimore, on the premise that, yes indeed, many of the
devils are in the details.
We face this question: Whether the welfare agency and its contractors are in fact helping TANF recipients move to work, on penalty of sanctions for the individual family, and the deepening
poverty of their children? These are questions of great public
concern.
My premise for this project is that the details of welfare policy
delivery are necessary fuel for the deeply democratic practices of
citizen critique, confrontation, negotiation (if citizens can get themselves to any of the relevant tables for negotiation), and creation of
some kind of meaningful change. In this particular contracting
process, this citizen scrutiny is appropriate at several junctures in
order to determine the effectiveness of welfare reform at the place
where the government services meet the recipient who must get off
welfare.
One of these junctures is the specificity and the scope of the request for proposal ("RFP") that the government writes and issues
to private vendors for job-related services. Another juncture for
citizen scrutiny is the contract rebid and renewal procedure for
vendors. Are vendors, in fact, held to standards of performance
that bear on the public policy objective of moving people from welfare to work? There are also important questions on the form of
agency management of ongoing contracts; and then, issues about
whether the state has utterly abdicated or retained some oversight
for a locality's implementation of welfare reform.
69. Id.

70. Id.
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Underscoring the urgency of this oversight is the fact that in
many states around the country it is the Department of Social Services that is asked to help people get from welfare to work, not the
work force development system of that state. 71 A few states have
made this arrangement differently.72 Maryland is one of those, and
there are several companions around the country, where we are
asking a welfare bureaucracy, not very much retooled, to put into
place a complex set of services to prepare people for work-work
which most of the affected people are not currently ready to doand also to plan and coordinate with the needs of a local economy,
particularly in declining center cities.73 This is a tall order.
Baltimore, for example, is one of the places that does not appear
to make much effort, if any, to coordinate its TANF work policies
and contracted services with the job development or economic development arms of the city or the state. In the new economy, this
is presumptively a dangerous omission, leading to the perpetuation
of yet another bleak economic ghetto, particularly for residents of
the state's largest city, and the source of its largest TANE recipients
caseload.
I engaged in a document review to audit the local welfare's
agency management of the TANF recipients' time-limited opportunity to prepare to leave welfare for work. I should underscore that
these welfare recipients who are prepared to enter the work force,
a population composed mainly of people who rely on welfare for a
short period of time, generally have left already: they got jobs.
Sometimes economic circumstances, like the loss of jobs, mean that
former welfare recipients return briefly. A large part of the question for all local agencies is: What happens to the individuals who
do not possess skills to perform the jobs that exist?
Baltimore contracts are in no way a model for any local contracts. I could give indications or illustrations of the utter vagueness and vacuity; the absence of targets or performance
benchmarks relating to relevant issues of policy, of availability of
jobs, the sustainability of that work, wages, retention of those jobs,
and so forth; the utter insufficiency of direction by the government
agency in the management of those contracts; and, most strikingly,
the utter lack of control mechanisms in the contracts subsequently
let. Nonetheless, Baltimore City has spent some fifty million dol71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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lars in contracts let and cannot make a report about what it has to
show for it.
PROFESSOR BRIFFAULT: Mr. Hawley.
MR. HAWLEY: First, my standard disclaimer: anything sensible
I might happen to say this morning reflects the opinion of my employer, the Conflicts of Interest Board of the City of New York
[hereinafter "Board"]. 7" Anything else is my own.
Regarding the Board, I want to acknowledge the presence on the
Fordham Law School faculty of Professor Bruce Green, who has
been a member of the Board since 1995 and is the Co-Director of
the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, a co-sponsor of this
Symposium. Bruce is, I think you would say, a walking public/private partnership in himself.
I am going to start with my tentative conclusion and then offer a
few examples that might illustrate or support, or might perhaps call
into question, that tentative conclusion.
My conclusion, which is unique because it is offered from the
perspective of the one nonacademic and one government employee here on the panel, is that, as an oversight mechanism, our
particular form of oversight-classic, post-Watergate public ethics
regulation; or better termed, conflict of interest regulation-is not
well suited, even if tinkered with, for the regulation of public/private partnerships.
A simple example would be a classic public defender system
staffed by public employees. Those government attorneys are regulated by the applicable city ethics board. However, here in New
York City, we have a contract with Professor Diller's75 old employer, the Legal Aid Society. We would not begin to think about
regulating the conflict of interest issues regarding those private attorneys because in any jurisdiction that privatizes its public employee/public defender system, a system that would be regulated
74. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2602 (2000). The New York City Conflict of Interests
Board is charged with administering New York City's Conflicts of Interest and Financial Disclosure laws. Id. § 2601. The Board's mission is to promote integrity of city
government by preventing unethical conduct through the enforcement of the ethics
laws. For more information, see the official Web site of the Board at http://nyc.gov/
ethics.
75. Professor Diller is a Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law,
where he is Coordinator of the William and Burton Cooper Chair on Urban Legal
Issues and the Associate Director of the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics. Professor Diller presented the introduction at the Symposium, reprinted in its entirety,
supra this volume of the Fordham Urban Law Journal. Introduction: Redefining the
Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization,28 FORDHAM
URn. L.J. 1307 (2001).
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pre-privatization, that privatized system would not be regulated.
That may or may not make sense, but that is my working
hypothesis.
As an aside, I want to note one thing about nomenclature. This
panel happens to use the term "public/private partnerships." The
other panels throughout the day, and the Symposium as a whole,
use the term "privatization." I am not sure they mean the same
thing. In my experience, those terms are used loosely, and sometimes to describe the same arrangement. Often those who favor
the arrangement use the term "public/private partnership" with violin music. Those who question it use the term, often with a sneer,
"privatization."
In any event, whatever term is used-and I prefer to use more
neutral terms, whether it is "vendor" or "government contractor"
or "provider"-although I will note later I think there are some
true public/private partnerships, they differ from the classic privatization model.
My tentative conclusion is that devices such as sound procurement policies, alert and effective contract management, and periodic management audits-with Elliott Sclar's point in mind, that
one person's oversight is another person's red tape 76-are better
suited to oversee many of these arrangements than ethics
regulation.
As for conflicts of interest regulation, at least as currently understood, and as an example, it would surely be a violation of any
respectable ethics code if a high-level executive branch official
hired his brother's company to provide goods or services to that
agency. However, there would be no violation if a government
contractor-say, a bridge designer-hired his brother to work on
the bridge project. The explanation of the different result is, of
course, that the ethics codes regulate the conduct of public officials
but not that of private individuals.
That explanation, if at least moderately satisfying, might come
up short in cases where a core government function is being privatized. Another example from an Internet discussion group I saw
some months ago involved a situation in Florida.77 There, the
writer wondered about ccontracting out the chief of staff position
76. See Remarks of Elliott Sclar, in Panel Discussion, The Changing Shape of
Government, in Symposium, Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization,28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1319 (2001).
77. Joe Follick, Ethics Panel Faces Its Former Aide for Lobbying, TAMPA TRIB.,
Mar. 22, 2001.
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to the entity's chief executive public officer. They apparently did
not have an Appointments Clause issue there, so they were thinking about ccontracting out this job. The question, of course, was:
Can this chief of staff be a private person and not subject to the
local ethics regulation?
I, frankly, did not have any particular useful thoughts, other than
the sort of common law notion that you might pierce the veil between what is truly an independent contractor and what is an employee. But that piercing solution did not lead me very far when
talking about a private entity, as opposed8to a single individual tak7
ing over a "core" government function.
But I do cling to my working conclusion, that classic ethics regulation is best suited to regulating public and not private conduct.
That is not to say, however, that such regulation cannot play a significant role in these interactions.
For example, while most such regulations, including those in
New York,79 impose penalties only on public servants, some jurisdictions, Ohio 8° and Alabama 81 among them, impose penalties on
private parties who induce public servants to violate ethics rules.
In other words, the private gift giver as well as the public gift recipient gets fined. Even here in the city, where, as I said, we only can
fine present or former servants and not private parties, the Board
does have an as-yet-unused power to void contracts that are involved in some kind of ethics violation, a power that previously
rested in the city comptroller.
Another fine-tuning concept, credited to Mark Davies, the Executive Director of the Conflicts Board, is that most ethics rules prohibit a public servant from using his or her position to advantage
himself, his family, or his business associates.
What about banning the use of one's public position to help campaign contributors? Perhaps this could be done with a threshold
amount, so that under such a rule, the elected official-the recipient of the contributions-would, under the common understanding
of the conflicts law, be required to recuse himself or herself from
any official involvement with that major campaign contributor.
This might mean that the official could not attend meetings, take
78. E.g., John Tierney, The Big City; Accountabiility at Prisons Run Privately, N.Y.
Aug. 15, 2000, at B1 (discussing the constroversy and debate over privatization
of prisons).
79. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2604 ("No public servant shall . . ... ") (emphasis
added).
80. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 102.03(F) (2001).
81. ALA. CODE § 36-25-5(d) (2000).
TIMES,
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phone calls, or receive documents. It might not make a particular
difference in contributions of soft campaign money, but it might
make a real difference in how willing contributors are to make
hard-dollar contributions. That, arguably, may have some impact
on the kinds of decisions made about who gets what contracts.
I will give one more citation that may be useful. The union issue
was mentioned.82 That example illustrates how classic ethics law
may produce too harsh a result as applied to privatization. If a
function were privatized, and the public-sector workers all stand to
lose their jobs, there might be classic revolving-door problems
about those workers not being able to find work in their field. We
are not talking about the agency heads now, we are talking about
the working stiff, the corrections officer, for example. New York
State has an exception for the layoff situation for those entry-level
workers.83
If not classic ethics regulation, what else? Contracts.
Contracts with vendors, contracts sensibly drawn to produce the
result desired, and not to hamper those people providing that service, might substitute. A contract that might, for example, in the
bridge designer case, if it was sensible, have forbidden the bridge
designer from hiring his brother. Obviously, with the independent
contractor chief of staff, if that truly is a nongovernmental position,
that official has got to have those kind of contract restrictions, too.
The city does this kind of thing. The city has, among its myriad,
quasi-public entities, the Economic Development Corporation
("EDC"), which is involved in a lot of the major job retention and
public land deals in the city. 84 That entity, for reasons not all that
interesting, does not happen to be covered by the conflicts rules,
but by contract. EDC staff come to the Board regularly for advice
about whether their conduct conforms to the city's ethics rules.
Ccontracting out the ethics regulation does seem to work in that
case.
To conclude, restrictions on the internal operations of private
contractors are perhaps less likely to be strongly resisted in the
wake of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for organizations,85
which appear to motivate corporations to adopt policies that they
82. See supra notes 34 to 36 and accompanying text.

83. N.Y.

PUB. OFF. LAW

§ 73.8(f) (Consol. 2001).

84. For information on the New York City Economic Development Corporation,

see http://www.newyorkbiz.com.
85. Individuals and groups convicted in federal court are sentenced pursuant to

the formulations set forth in the U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL.

These

Guidelines are relevant in the sentencing of corporate entities, and take into account,
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did not have previous to the adoption of the Guidelines about ten
years ago.
PROFESSOR STURM: The first panel this morning really addressed this problem of new governance from the top-down. It
took an over-arching look at these new patterns and attempted to
figure out how our current ways of thinking about them are inadequate and how we need to start developing new categories, new
frameworks, new sets of questions.
One could think about this panel as the bottom-up panel. Barbara 86 said the devil is in the details. Well, what does that mean?
This panel is, like this morning's panel in some ways, also taking
the view that to understand where to go next in terms of public
oversight, we need the top-down theory that helps us have a new
set of categories. It also is taking the view that we need to look at
some detailed theoretical problems like: Where are the incentives
to include the range of stakeholders with an interest in regulatory
problems? How are we going to deal with differences in power
that will shape the way in which the public can participate in decision-making effectively? How do you construct information systems in the face of tremendous incentives to hoard information,
particularly in light of legal regulation? And how do you create
regular opportunities for the public actually to reflect and engage
with the information that they get?
Now, my approach to answering these questions is from the bottom-up. Hopefully, looking deeply at context will help us rethink
the theory. I have examined this problem in the context of the
regulation of workplace bias, or more particularly, the regulation
'87
of what I call "second-generation employment discrimination.
Unlike first-generation cases, in which overt acts are clearly identifiable as problematic and in which the remedial solutions are somewhat clear, second-generation problems are structural, relational,
interactive, and complex. They often emerge out of institutional or
among other things, whether the entity has established an internal good citizen program (e.g., ethical standards and compliance procedures). Id. § 8C2.5(f) (1995).
As a result, virtually overnight, all major corporations have done something, a
change reflected in the mushrooming over the past decade of the Ethics Officers Association (EOA), the association of the compliance officers at America's major corporations. The Association's Web site is at http://www.eoa.org.
86. See Remarks of Barbara Bezdek, supra this Panel Discussion.
87. These ideas are more fully developed in Professor Sturm's recent article Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L.
REV.
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organizational interaction, so rules do no work well to deal with
this type of bias.
Now, "privatization" does not adequately describe where governance or regulation has moved in employment discrimination,
because the law continues to regulate this field. More importantly,
legal actors of all types are heavily involved inside and outside organizations. At the same time, regulation, in the top-down command-and-control sense, also does not adequately describe or
prescribe where we need to go in terms of oversight.
So an interesting form of governance has emerged in this field
that pushes us, first, to rethink the language of privatization, as we
heard this morning. 88 I refer to this emerging new form as a "structural approach to second-generation bias," which essentially poses
issues of problem solving. This is a form of regulation that encourages the development of institutions and processes to enact general
norms in specific contexts. It establishes a framework both within
and across organizations, continually to reassess the adequacy of
these structured interactions, and their implications for general
norms. It embraces experimentation as an important part of this
process-experimentation with organizational structure, decisionmaking, incentives, and accountability.
Workplaces and nongovernmental institutions are treated as lawmaking bodies within this legal regime. They interact with public
regulatory bodies, rather than serving only as objects of state regulation. Now, I think the best way to make clear what I am talking
about is to give one example of this and then talk about the theoretical implications of that example.
I start in the workplace, because all of this regulation is really
about trying to shape practice on the ground. So let's take an example from a company called Home Depot. 89 This is a company
that had a problem. Female employees were being steered primarily to dead-end jobs. Home Depot's female employees and applicants throughout its West Coast division alleged gender
discrimination in hiring, initial assignments, promotions, compensation, and training. This situation coincided with the company's
88. See generally Panel Discussion, The Changing Shape of Government, in Symposium, Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of
Privatization,28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1319 (2001).
89. Home Depot is the world's largest home improvement retailer. The company
innovated the home improvement industry, and caters to do-it-yourself home improvement construction and building maintenance. For a more complete discussion of
Home Depot's effort to address gender bias and improve their employment practices,
see Sturm, supra note 87, at 509-18.
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concern that its more informal hiring and promotion process did
not work well for the large, fast-paced company that Home Depot
had become.
Barry Goldstein, one of the foremost employment discrimination lawyers in the country, represented a class of plaintiffs in a
class action challenging the company's hiring and promotion practices. 90 That case settled on the eve of trial. 91 The settlement
agreement created is a very interesting public/private governance
structure. Basically, the company took responsibility for designing
a system at the intersection of equity and efficiency. It put together an internal problem-solving team with input from plaintiffs'
lawyers, who basically acted as a stand-in for the state, and outside
experts who had many opportunities to plan these types of systems
both with government regulators and other companies.
The solution to the problems of inequity and inefficiency was to
achieve accountability through technology, information systems,
and systematizing discretion, rather than through rules. Home Depot added a computer-based job application system that basically
made it impossible for a manager to steer workers to particular
jobs based upon race or gender. More importantly, the settlement
agreement built in institutional problem-solving systems and actors, equipping internal and external agents to use the data from
the hiring and promotional system to reveal patterns that relate
both to equity and efficiency, and then to use benchmarks that
would prompt the company to inquire further when the
benchmarks were not met. Basically, they were building the capacity of constituencies inside and outside of the organization to problem solve in ways that would address the underlying problem.
So where is law in this? First of all, in this structural regime, law
defined the goal and the problem very differently. Instead of having a rule that very specifically dictated "this is how many people
you should employ in this way," the law, as interpreted by the
court in the early stages of this litigation,92 adopted this structural
approach. The documented pattern of gender exclusion was a signal that forced reflection about the adequacy of the decisionmaking processes within the organization. The problem was the
90. Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335 SI, C-95-2182 SI, 1997 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 16296 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1997); Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335 SI,
1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3370 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 1996).
91. Home Depot Settles Women's Class Action, IN THE WORKPLACE, Winter 1998,

available at http://www.mbc.com/db30/cia-bin/pubs/laborwinter98.pdf.
92. Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1257 (1997).
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systems and their arbitrary exclusion of women. Then, that framework provided an incentive to create new institutions and systems
of accountability that would change the underlying discriminatory
condition while simultaneously improving the effectiveness of
those systems in making good decisions more generally.
Instead of having a rule that would be enforced after the fact, the
law embraced contextualization as part of the process of elaborating the legal norm.93 Also, it defined the underlying legal problem
as a condition or problem that had to be effectively addressed. 94 It
encouraged, indeed, embraced, institutional innovation within
workplaces by prescribing an approach that encourages employers
to take accountability for making change. 95 It provided for accountability by evaluating the effectiveness of the internal
processes in relation to predefined criteria.96
One of the important pieces of this problem, if we have a generally articulated norm and we are encouraging institutional innovation, is to determine what will bridge the legal norm to the reality
of the workplace. How will employers translate legal norms into
day-to-day practice? What incentives do they have to link concerns of equity with long-term efficiency? This poses a particular
challenge for employers who do not already recognize the longterm benefit to be realized by instituting fair employment
practices.
Third-party actors or "mediating organizations" come in at this
point. In each of the examples of companies that have developed
these kinds of internal effective systems of problem-solving, intermediary actors, both individuals and organizations, have played a
key role. They compensate for the limitations of both government
regulation in its traditional form and in the market.
If courts assume direct responsibility for articulating legal norms,
they will fail to develop a set of legal rules adequate to address the
needs of particular workplaces. This process of institutional design
requires the participation of those who understand the culture of
93. Id. at 1261-62; Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 990
(1988) (holding that disparate impact applies to subjective employment systems, including "an employer's undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking").
94. Butler, 984 F. Supp. at 1266; Sturm, supra note 87, at 478-79.
95. Butler, 984 F. Supp. at 1266. Business necessity, under this approach, is established by showing that the employer took steps that minimized the degree of unaccountable or unstructured discretion and thus the expression of bias. See Butler v.
Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335 SI, 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3370, at *33 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 24, 1996).
96. Butler, 984 F. Supp. at 1266; Sturm, supra note 87, at 488-89.
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the particular setting and who must cooperate in the implementation of any new system. Yet, if you delegate this problem entirely
to the workplace, you would sacrifice accountability in relation to
public norms, as well as the opportunity to pool knowledge about
how best to achieve these norms through institutional innovation.
This dilemma seems intractable if regulation is posed as a necessary choice between government regulation dictated by rules, and
privatization dictated by the market. But a third way of proceeding has begun to develop, in part through the emergence of nongovernmental actors who serve as intermediaries between formal
legal institutions. These intermediary organizations include insurance companies and nonprofit research organizations that bring together companies, consultants, and lawyers who develop
effectiveness criteria and then pool information. These mediating
actors perform the important, shared function of building capacity
and constituencies to operate effective and accountable mechanisms, generating norms of effectiveness, and constructing practice
communities across boundaries that permit necessary cross-boundary work to take place.
Case studies such as this one involving Home Depot clearly illustrate how intermediaries bridge conventional dichotomies such as
public/private, legal/non-legal, general/contextual, and coercive/cooperative, by creating tiers of relationships that translate between the workplace and the formal institutions that articulate and
enforce the law.
Some of these change agents are individual professionals such as
human resource professionals and lawyers who, as repeat players,
have the resources to build expertise within a field. There are also
organizations that act as mediators of change. Catalyst 97 and the
Center for Gender and Organizations98 work within and between
private organizations and governments. Insurance companies are
another example. They create incentives for organizations to install internal accountability mechanisms to reduce their premium,
and provide resources to firms that do not have the in-house capacity to do this. Additionally, there are professional organizations
that have not yet undertaken the role of formulating criteria of ef97. Catalyst is "America's leading nonprofit organization working to advance women in business and the professions." For more information, see Catalyst's Web site
at http://www.catalystwomen.org/home.html.
98. The Center for Gender in Organization ("CGO") at Simmons Graduate
School of Management is a "major catalyst for change in promoting gender equity in
organizations in both the profit and not-for-profit sectors worldwide." For more information, see their Web site at http://www.simmons.edu/gsm/cgo/index.html.
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fectiveness of holding their members accountable for responsible
practice.
Both individual and organizational mediating actors are looked
to, both by companies and by courts, to put general legal norms
into context.
The next important step is to theorize about the emerging roles
of these "problem solvers," who cross boundaries and deploy multiple disciplines in their work. They are emerging in disciplines
such as law, accounting, business, human resource practice, systems
design, and information technology. A coherent, problem-solving
practice seems to be emerging across discipline boundaries.
But important questions remain unanswered such as: One, what
is that practice? Two, how do we understand it? Three, how do we
discover what an effective intermediary organization is? And four,
how will organizations be held accountable for their crucial role of
providing for both democracy and accountability in these public/
private relationships?
Thank you.
PROFESSOR TRUBEK: This is my fourth Fordham conference, the third for the Fordham Urban Law Journal, and I have
obtained a tremendous amount of insight from my many times
here.
Today, I am joined by two other people from Wisconsin, who
will participate in this afternoon's discussion. So, not only do you
have the East Side/West Side/crosstown New York discussion, but
our own little Wisconsin discussion as well.
Today, I want to talk about being a public interest lawyer in a
state that has been a leader in privatization and whose governor is
now going to help lead some of that privatization from Washington, D.C.99 It is no coincidence that the three of us who do most of
our work in Wisconsin will provide a very different perspective.
I am going to discuss how public interest practice responds to
privatization in a state that has substantially-and to some extent
much more successfully-attempted to incorporate interesting values and mechanisms than has Baltimore.
To me, what I am trying to do as a public interest lawyer is deal
with the "democracy problem."100 I have divided the "democracy
99. Governor Tommy Thompson was recently appointed by President Bush as
Secretary of Health and Human Services. David E. Sanger, Bush Cabinet Takes
Shape, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000, § 4, at 2.
100. See generally Panel Discussion, The Changing Shape of Government, in Symposium, Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of
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problem" into three aspects: (1) transparency (getting the information); (2) participation; and (3) redistribution. These are the three
privatization aspects focused on by people interested in the representation of disadvantaged groups.
After all, public interest lawyers like myself established public
interest law firms in the 1960s and 1970s in order to bring to the
forefront voices not being heard through public agencies-the
same public agencies that are now being privatized. We were, by
our own definition, critics, and therefore in no position to stand on
our high horse today and say "privatization is all bad because the
public system is all good."
So what happened when privatization occurred? Why is it significant from the vantage point of the public interest lawyer and how
has it changed our practice? Let me address these questions by
discussing three areas of privatization in Wisconsin in which I have
participated. The first is health care. The second, welfare reform,
is the best-known in Wisconsin, but actually the one in which I
have done the least. The third is telecommunication.
Let me begin with health care. From the start, Wisconsin has
been at the forefront of health care privatization through the development of managed care. Managed care, or managed competition, is an effort to privatize both the delivery and financing of
health services through managed care organizations.10 1 Privatization occurred both in Medicaid-which is a government-provided
healthcare program for low-income people-and in the private employment area. 10 2
I continue to be active in both aspects. I represent underrepresented consumers, health-care consumers, and low-income
people on Medicaid. I also am involved in the development of patient protections, which are a response to privatization upon managed care's entrance into the private sector. Patient protections
are a systemic response to abuses in the development of managed
care.

Privatization,28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1319 (2001) (discussing the democracy problem
in the context of the changing shape of government as it addresses issues such as
globalization).
101. Professor Trubek's discussion is based upon an essay, appearing in its entirety,
infra, this volume of the Fordham Urban Law Journal. Louise Trubek, Old Wine in
New Bottles: Public Interest Lawyering in an Era of Privatization,28 FORDHAM URB.
L. J. 1739 (2001).
102. Id.
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The second area is welfare reform. Here, I simply want to supplement what Barbara said earlier. 10 3 For those of you who are not
familiar with the history of welfare reform, in Wisconsin we were a
little different from other states because we had originated the legislation that created what became the federal welfare reform; specifically, our state legislature created a program called "W-2" that
predated PRWORA.' 04 Under W-2, the administration of the welfare programs of what became the TANF program10 5 had to be
contracted out, and those contracts had to be accompanied by performance standards. So we were one step ahead of some of the
issues that have come up subsequently, and we had a principled
16
view of what privatization and welfare reform would mean.'
The third area is telecommunications. In 1994, Wisconsin privatized telecommunications.10 7 Eventually the whole United States
privatized telecommunications through what is called "deregulation,"108 which eliminated a lot of rate regulation and was an effort

to open up more competition in telecommunications. 10 9 Telecommunications deregulation has not been the disaster that electric
utilities deregulation was in California. 1t 0
One part of deregulation is the creation of the Universal Service
Fund."' Funding was obtained from telecommunications providers to create programs that would ensure equity and access for
those underrepresented groups that might lose access to service or
competitive rates as a result of deregulation, such as rural consumers, low-income people, people who live in cities, and persons with
disabilities. 2 The Fund is administered by the Wisconsin Public
Service Commission, which is advised by a committee consisting of
what are called "consumers" and providers. I have served on that
committee for the last four years.
103. See Remarks of Barbara Bezdek, supra this Panel Discussion.
104. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
("PRWORA"), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2279 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C).
105. Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2001).
106. Id. at 4.
107. WISc. STAT. § 196. 218 (1994) (deregulating telecommunications in Wisconsin); Trubek, supra note 101.
108. See Adam Nathe, Special Report-Promoting Universal Service Through
Grant Funding for Non-Profits: Wisconsin PSC § 160.125's First Grant Cycle, in 26
THE PUBLIC EYE (2001).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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From these three examples of privatization, what have I and my
colleagues learned? We were a public interest law firm, created in
the 1970s with the goal of providing input into the regulatory process on behalf of underrepresented people. We were active in representing these groups-healthcare consumers, low-income people.
We were active in providing representation in these three areas for
a period of, say, fifteen years.
I learned three things. First: strengthen non-profits. When you
privatize, which I call the "movement out," you are taking power
from the state, the government, and putting it into the hands of
various private actors. One of the major actors is nonprofits. President Bush contributed to this trend by creating a new office, the
13
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.'
I always have been very interested in supporting nonprofits.
Community economic development," 4 which is very important,
also relies on a foundation of nonprofits.
We have worked to strengthen nonprofits. For example, the
Universal Service Fund recently dedicated one million dollars a
year to be spent on tele-medicine nonprofits, and nonprofits that
provide healthcare services. Specifically, that is five-hundred thousand dollars for each to be able to develop technology to enable
them to be efficient and provide better services to their clients.
The ultimate end is that by receiving these funds, they will become
effective actors in providing services.
Second, my experience with privatization and public interest
lawyering taught me to collaborate with groups that had diverse
interests and expertise. In this regard, it is interesting that Chuck
Sabel this morning noted that such collaboration exists suggests
that the system has failed.1 15 We are in agreement. I have worked
with these unexpected allies precisely because the system had
failed in all three areas.
My work in health care has been extremely interesting. I spend
a lot of my time working with physicians and physicians' groups
113. OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, EXECUTIVE ORDER,
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF CENTER FOR FAITH BASED INITIATIVES (2001) (creating the office to "develop, lead, and coordinate the Administration's policy agenda affecting faith-based and other community programs

and

initiatives, expand the role of such efforts in communities, and increase their capacity
through executive action, legislation, Federal and private funding, and regulatory
relief").
114. See generally, Trubek, supra note 101.
115. See Panel Discussion, The Changing Shape of Government, in Symposium,
Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatiza-

tion, 28

FORDHAM URB.

L.J. 1319 (2001).
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who had a very uneasy relationship with consumers and patients
prior to the onset of managed care. Now, both groups are frightened, and do not know what to do. Doctors have lost a lot of their
power, and are eager to work in collaboration with consumer
groups-proof of Sabel's adage that if there is that kind of collaboration going on, then there is a problem in the system.
The collaboratives I participate in are helping to resolve this
problem. We are the canary in the coal mine. The existence of
collaboratives shows there is a problem, but hopefully, we also are
contributing to some positive changes.
The third thing I learned is that monitoring performance and
creating standards is important. We did that in the health care sector by creating standards and monitoring performance in both the
16
Medicaid managed care and in patient protection."
We have attempted to transfer some of that knowledge and
learning to the welfare reform system, with very mixed success. I
think perhaps Dave Riemer will talk a little more about that this
afternoon.1 1 7 But we have attempted to use, and are using, that
effort at monitoring what is happening, creating standards, making
sure those standards reflect what Barbara talked about, actual results for the people. 18 That is not an easy thing to do. It requires a
lot of new collaboration skills and ideas. But we were fortunate in
that we went through this experience with health care first, so
when welfare reform came, we were able to transfer some of that
learning. Perhaps the new Secretary of Health and Human Services will apply this experience at the national level.
These shifts in our practice have led to my reconceptualizing
how public interest law should be practiced today. As I talk with
students about what public interest practice should look like in the
future, I tell them to diversify where they practice, how they approach their work, and also that they always need to learn different
skills.
I feel that privatization has led to a rethinking of the role of public interest lawyers in our society today. It is part of many other
trends, including the necessity of lawyers working together with

116. Trubek, supra note 101.
117. See Remarks of David Riemer, in Panel Discussion, Privatization in Practice:
Human Services, in Symposium, Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization,28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1435 (2001).
118. See Bezdek, supra note 47.
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other professionals, forcing a dramatic rethinking of what public
interest law can and should be. 119
Thanks.
PROFESSOR BRIFFAULT: I am going to throw out two observations of my own, see if anybody on the panel wants to respond,
and then take questions from the floor.
These observations are provoked in particular by Susan Sturm's
and Louise Trubek's comments, but also, I think, by Barbara
Bezdek's research. What we are seeing apparently is the emergence of new forms of new accountability mechanisms that are
themselves private actors-Louise's public interest law firm, 120 the
intermediaries that Susan has been talking about,12 ' and Barbara's
own research.' 2 2 It sounds like you will find the lack of accountability within Baltimore, but you, yourself, are the accountability
mechanism, for better or for worse. Once your reports come out,
that will be a form of accountability.
And so, are we seeing the emergence of the privatization of accountability mechanisms, and is that a good thing or a bad thing?
Is that part of the solution, part of the problem, or both?
PROFESSOR TRUBEK: Well, Wayne' 23 pointed out the privatization of ethics standards regulation. I think that is very
significant.
In a sense, I see this as an opportunity for us to grow. We were
ahead of our times in that regard. We focused on accountability
toward a narrower set of institutions.
PROFESSOR STURM: I would have to reiterate that the dichotomy does not really work that well. What makes these intermediary actors effective is having a legal norm, general as it is, and
some sanction attached to it, because there has to be the creation
of incentives to engage with these intermediary actors. And secondly, it is often in the public settings that you have the greatest
incentives for the pooling of information that is crucial to building
capacity.

119. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek & Jennifer J. Farnham, Social Justice Collaboratives: Multidisciplinary Practicesfor People, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 227 (2000).
120. See Remarks of Louise Trubek, supra this Panel Discussion.
121. See Remarks of Susan Sturm, supra this Panel Discussion.
122. See Bezdek, supra note 47.
123. See Remarks of Wayne Hawley, supra this Panel Discussion.
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So without some kind of norm of effectiveness, for example, that
underlies the sexual harassment employer liability standard1 2 4 that
currently permits employers to avoid liability if they create internal
problem-solving mechanisms, there has to be some public law
baseline. An exception should be made if a court that is going to
be there to say, "Well, I am not going to articulate what those criteria of effectiveness are; I am going to look to those mediating actors to help us do that. But you have got to have developed them;
and, if you did not and this pattern exists, you are going to be held
accountable." Accountability is formed in relationship with these
mediating actors.
So I would say "yes, but."
PROFESSOR BEERMANN: My reaction to your question is
that there is a phenomenon of redescribing in slightly different
terms something that has existed for a very long time. The Framers
of the Constitution of the United States were worried about factions. We have had private organizations that have engaged in a
lot of monitoring of government for a very long time.
The issue I brought up about government corporations in this
country could date back to the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Was
the government a public or private entity when it ruled what is now
Maine, part of New Hampshire, and Massachusetts?
I think that there are already a lot of accountability mechanisms.
For example, the Underwriters Laboratory,2 5 which, if your product has their seal, you know that your clock radio is not going to
blow up when you plug it in. Many organizations like that function
in a very similar way.
A lot of these are phenomena and mechanisms that have existed
for a very long time. Whenever you see something for the first
time, or it is brought up in a new way, there is a temptation to
redescribe it theoretically in much the way that the original lawand-economics scholarship was characterized as nominalism; 126 it
was just a way of renaming lots of things that everybody had seen
in the past.
I think sometimes renaming can be very useful because it brings
a new angle or perspective and we can attack problems. So I do
124. See Panel Discussion, The Changing Shape of Government, in Symposium,
Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1319 (2001).

125. For information on Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., see http://www.ul.com.
126. Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 459 (1974).
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not mean to criticize the idea that we should be doing what we are
talking about in terms of the way we do it, but I do not think it is
necessarily all that new.
PROFESSOR BEZDEK: I agree with both Jack and Susan. Certainly in my position in Baltimore, it is one thing to call upon actors
to be accountable and another thing to get them to be accountable.
And so, the point that matters most is that we actually need some
mechanism by which to require a response.
Yes, we have had intermediaries, outside groups, that have taken
it upon themselves to call upon government or call upon private
actors to be responsible,1 27 to create the intersections of efficiency
and equity. But that does not mean that private actors are
responding.
PROFESSOR BRIFFAULT: So the answers are either that it is
not happening or it has always happened, or possibly both.
PROFESSOR STURM: I think it is really interesting to observe
that the more activity there is in the intermediate sector in defining
how to do privatization, the more willing are public agencies to
become involved, because the public agency, or the court, does not
want to be the one to construct these standards whole cloth. But if
there is a lot of activity suggesting that the court would necessarily
be put in that role and that there were constituencies out there
holding the court accountable, it is easier to say, "Okay, I am going
to articulate the broad standard and then hold you to it."
PROFESSOR BRIFFAULT: Just one other question, then I will
open it up. Are there two accountability problems here? The first
relating to delegation doctrine, accountability to the public as a
whole, whether the public is perceived of as taxpayers, policy-setters, or the electorate, and the underlying legitimacy of any system.
There also may be a second accountability issue, which is the
relationship to the constituency receiving service. Is the accountability problem different when we are talking about increased
changes in the way we deliver social services? We're talking about
people receiving income supports, welfare-to-work training, lowincome people receiving subsidized health care, addiction services,
treatments like that, prisons. Is there a need for building in some
kind of accountability to the constituency as well as to the public,
or is that a different set of issues?
PROFESSOR BEERMANN: In my paper, I call that "accountability writ small. 128 It is the responsiveness of the entity to the
127. See Bezdek, supra note 47.
128. See Beermann, supra note 4.
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people that are being served, as when you have contracting out
that is not just buying paper clips for the government office, but
providing services to needy people. That distinction has existed for
a long time also. Government contracts out to build roads, it has
been doing that for a very long time, and that affects people.
But in social service providing, the first thing they ask is: "Was
there a general perception that when government directly provides
social services, it is very responsive to the people who are getting
it?" I think the answer to that would probably be "not very much."
So now you say: "Well, is the private entity that has contracted
with the government going to be more or less accountable to the
service recipient?"
Obviously, if you make it a situation where there is an array of
service providers and the private individual has the opportunity to
choose the different ones-for example, in the short period of time
that Medicare people could go to every HMO. Those HMOs were
falling all over each other competing for the business. That is substituting market accountability for government accountability.
When you have private service providers, there is not a situation
in which a recipient has to go to the Department of Social Services
and complain and get some supervisor to tell the line worker "answer this service recipient's inquiry." Such a delivery scheme was
hopeless to a lot of people. But when you substitute market accountability, then an array of service providers, choice, and accountability can all coexist.
But there is a perception that the profit motive-for example, in
corrections-really reduces the incentive for the corrections people
to treat inmates decently. In a documentary I saw on Court TV,
there was a suggestion that the increased criminalization of conduct is the result of lobbying by Wackenhut and Corrections Corporation of America. They want more business, so they lobbied to
make more conduct criminal.
Professor William Stuntz from Harvard has written about the
fact that now almost everything you do is criminal, some whitecollar crime or something; if you call someone a name, it is harass29
ment; if you cheat them in a contract, it is fraud.
There may be reasons to fear a combination of a strong profit
motive and little incentive for the outside world to monitor. I
mean, many people really do not care how prisoners are treated.
Maybe they would if we are talking about juveniles, but does the
129. William J. Stuntz, The Deep Politics of Criminal Law (on file with Professor
Jack M. Beermann).

1388

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL[Vol. XXVIII

body politic generally care whether prisoners are given just
bologna sandwiches every day or whether they are given three
square meals? If there is no effective outside monitoring, and if
the demotion after letting people escape from your prison is from
warden of a state prison to being the person who monitors these
private prisons, we can imagine that there is an accountability
problem. Even if the public doesn't care, where is the accountability to the recipients of the services, the prisoners and their families
that want to visit them?
PROFESSOR STURM: I want to note a relationship between
the two kinds of accountability, particularly in a situation where
the constituency is most closely connected in their interests to at
least one definition of the norm-the public regulatory norm that
you care about-so that having them involved at the table is also
crucial to defining that public norm. But you do not want to allow
a particular site responding to accountability concerns about a constituency within a particular site to define the public norm, so it is
really important to think both within a particular context and
across contexts to how you link together, or where you want to
keep distinct, the accountability to the constituency most directly
affected by the norm involved, and to the concerns of the polity as
a whole.
QUESTION: I had an observation: in both the first and second
panels, this issue of what is public and what is private became
somewhat muddied. I believe that if you have private operators
with market governance, that is a very viable alternative to a public
sector. But many panelists have been saying that market mechanisms are very weak in a lot of the instances.
This then leads to a cynical question: If we do not have a clear
delineation between public and private, and we are concerned
about accountability, and market governance does not prove to be
the best example, are we not just rearranging the deck chairs on
the Titanic? I am not convinced we are moving anywhere here.
QUESTION: This question is directed to Professor Trubek. A
recent article that I read in the magazine Dollars and Sense did an
expos6 about MAXIMUS Corporation in Milwaukee and how they
recently had been found to have misused hundreds of thousands of
dollars in their welfare contract. 130 Wisconsin had contracted with
MAXIMUS to provide welfare services. MAXIMUS was found to
130. Karyn Rotker, Corporate Welfare for Welfare Corporations, DOLLARS &
Jan./Feb. 2001, available at http://www.dollarsandsense.org/2001/233rotker.htm.
SENSE,
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have used some of the state money to send their employees to New
York City to lobby the Human Resources Administration, New
York City's human services agency, to get a contract here to provide welfare services.
We are talking about accountability, so I want to know what has
been done to address these seemingly commonplace, gross, and illegal actions?
PROFESSOR TRUBEK: The connection between MAXIMUS,
Wisconsin, and New York is very interesting. The MAXIMUS issue received a lot of attention, and there has been action on the
part of Wisconsin and its legislature in response. MAXIMUS has
been a focal point, but we have a lot of nonprofits that are also
doing the contracting in Milwaukee. Milwaukee is all contracted
out. David Riemer will be in a better position to talk about that
this afternoon.
There was some misunderstanding or vagueness in Milwaukee's
contract with MAXIMUS regarding what kind of expenses were
appropriate. Probably no government agency would have sent
their staff to these very expensive training sessions or brought in
whomever they brought in as an entertainer because that is considered inappropriate in the public sector, particularly in Wisconsin,
which is very puritanical. The private sector contractors came from
a much more loose corporate culture. So some of that had to do
with a misunderstanding of cultures.
But MAXIMUS was very heavily chastised and new regulations
and policies were put out as a result.
DR. MASTRAN: I am the CEO of MAXIMUS and I would like
to address certain questions.1 31 There are a lot of things that went
wrong in Wisconsin, and MAXIMUS is at fault in many ways. In
the instance you talk about, where we sent people off-site to go to
training, that is a "cost-plus contract" we had in Wisconsin, and
there is something called "employee welfare" that is generally regarded, in government terms, as an "allowable cost." Under that
allowable cost of employee welfare, we took our management staff
off-site and trained them. This is done in all our projects all around
the country. We got the scrutiny of a state audit committee going
in and looking at this contract. The auditors picked out that cost as
131. David Mastran addresses in depth a number of questions raised here and defends the record of MAXIMUS during the final Panel Discussion in this Symposium.
See Remarks of David Mastran, in Panel Discussion, Privatizationin Practice:Human
Services, in Symposium, Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy
in the Era of Privatization,28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1.435 (2001).
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inflammatory and the press picked up the story. But it is an allowable government cost. Nonetheless, when we were challenged in
Wisconsin, we said, "Fine."
In terms of the "entertainment," it was Melba Moore, the singer
from Broadway. We brought her in because she is a former welfare recipient who became a huge success. When we won the contract, we were told by the state, "Look, you are the private sector.
We want innovative ways to get people off welfare. We want you
to think outside the box. We want you to do things that we the
state cannot do so that we can test new ideas, and what is the value
of outsourcing if we do not do that?"
So one of our people came up with the idea, "Why don't we get
Melba Moore, as a former welfare recipient, to come out, and we
will gather welfare recipients together, and we will have her do
motivational speeches and then, since she is a singer, she can sing
after?" So we did that. It sounds terrible when the press gets it
because it sounds like we are hiring Broadway singers to come out
and help welfare recipients. In fact, we were doing something with
the tacit approval of the state, before there were specific guidelines
on what could and could not be done. When the state challenged
the expense, we said, "Fine, we will pay for it."
So if you look at what is going on in Wisconsin, and even in New
York, we are a firm that is trying to do a good job, that is getting
caught up in a situation where the government really has no financial standards established on what cost is allowable and what is not
allowable. We were encouraged to be innovative, we were innovative, and we got "caught" trying to do something good.
The true problem in Wisconsin was that MAXIMUS overbilled
the state by $500,000. The papers got hold of the story, but focused
on certain cost items, like Ms. Moore's fees. What is not known,
what was not publicized, is we also underbilled them $1.6 million.
The invoicing system in the state was complex. Our people did
not understand it. We messed it up. I take the blame. We lost $1.6
million that we did not bill, but we also made mistakes and overbilled them $500,000. So the net result was we paid them the
$500,000 that we overbilled them, and we agreed that we would not
be reimbursed for the underbilling because the term of the contract
had expired and we could not claim now that we had underbilled.
It was our own fault.
But, in addition, MAXIMUS said: "Look, we have caused a lot
of problems here inadvertently. We will take the responsibility."
So MAXIMUS has, through our MAXIMUS Foundation, donated
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$500,000 to local charities, nonprofit organizations in Milwaukee,
to try to say, "Look, we are sorry we made these mistakes."
There is a context for all of these contract problems. What you
read in the paper is only the sensational aspect of it.
QUESTION: I have a question about a recent case in New York
City that brings in some of the questions the moderator talked
about. 13 2 There was a panel of private experts reviewing the standard of foster care in New York City, 13 3 which is the only city dealing with taking care of children through mostly private
organizations. 3 Most families dealing with the city agency that
was reformed in the case, the Administration for Children's Services, still do not feel satisfied with what happened as a result of
135
the Marisol A. case.
It takes on a lot of the aspects of what we are talking about, in
that there is a group of people served who are not really looked at
by the rest of us as "worthy" of services, who do not have a loud
voice anymore, especially since most of their attorneys are Legal
Services Corporation attorneys who cannot speak out for them
based on federal regulations. Could you comment on that and put
it into your perspectives and where you think things would go on
that?
MR. HAWLEY: As it happened, Mariso1 36 occurred to me during Susan's remarks. That consent decree, which brought in
outside mediators of the kind you are talking about, I believe some
from Baltimore, such as the Annie E. Casey Foundation 137 was a
sensible mechanism to approach a very difficult problem.
I have a lot of respect for the effort being made by the current
head of the Administration for Children's Services, in what is a
132. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
133. The audience member's question refers to the Special Child Welfare Advisory
Panel. For more information, see http://www.aecf.org/child.
134. New York City uses contract agencies to serve approximately eighty percent of
the children and families that enter the child welfare system. See Press Release, Annie
E. Casey Found., Advisory Panel Reports on Monitoring and Improving the Performance of Contract Agencies. For more information on The Annie E. Casey Foundation,
which works to support disadvantaged children and -their families, see http://
www.aecf.org/child.
135. Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y 1996) (denying motion to
dismiss and certifying class for plaintiffs alleging systematic deficiencies in the administration of the New York City Child Welfare System); Marisol A. v. Guiliani, 185
F.R.D. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (approving the settlement agreement).
136. See cases cited supra note 135.
137. See supra note 134.
138. Mr. Hawley refers to Nicholas Scopetta, Commissioner, New York City Administration for Children's Services.
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near-impossible job. That kind of solution seemed to me a sensible
one, as it did to the plaintiff's lawyers, who, as you know, litigated
that case and others like it for decades.
PROFESSOR BEZDEK: Let me say that the question speaks to
the two dimensions of what we all have been talking about here.
One is the substance of what is it that should be prescribed, and the
other is the mechanism by which that should be prescribed. You
are speaking about a settlement in which the parties agreed, and
the court accepted, that private entities should be empaneled to
bring their expertise to prescribe something that should happen
next to reform the delivery of government services.
There is a variety of those mechanisms by which government or
others could do that. The information explosion in the realm of
monitoring welfare outcomes is astonishing. But a lot of that information is held by private actors. Some are private actors under big
federally-funded contracts for evaluation, government contracts by
the U.S. General Accounting Office and several other branches of
government. So there are lots of sources, some public, some private, some public/private partnerships, for providing substantive
information about welfare reform; yet access to public information
still needs to be better-to figure out what it is that should apply in
a given setting to a given problem.
That does not answer, then, the question about how will it be
made the responsibility of the acting organizations, be they private,
public, or some new-fangled mix, to respond to requests for information or accountability.
So in the welfare-to-work arena I described a pretty deplorable
system in Baltimore. 39 In welfare-to-work there actually are some
other remarkable state programs that have been well examined.
Additionally, there is a federal system for the Department of Labor's welfare-to-work grant program, which has vastly more extensive specifications for what are the problems to be addressed, what
was the measure of performance, who gets paid how, that kind of
thing, compared to what Baltimore does.
Workforce development services, which are not focused on welfare recipients, are another context in which to examine how pro139. See, e.g., Kate Shatzkin, More Former Welfare Recipients Are Returning to Assistance Rolls, BALT. SUN, Oct. 11, 2000; Kate Shatzkin, Study Finds Workers Off Welfare Often Remain in Need of Assistance, BALT. SUN, Oct. 6, 2000. Contra Press
Release, Innovators in Welfare to Work Initiatives Recognized by U.S. Dep't of Labor, Oct. 25, 2000 (recognizing innovative and outstanding welfare-to-work programs
around the country) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
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fessionals in a field other than welfare services prepare people to
move into work and to have value-added experiences when moving
to work.
So these really are questions: Where do you go for information
about how to solve a service delivery problem with contractual regulations and what mechanisms are available to give teeth to those
regulations?
PROFESSOR BEERMANN: In cases like this, the most important accountability issue is information, because it is relatively
common that in child welfare, services are provided by private
groups. When they were provided by public hospitals and public
homes, a lot of lawsuits were brought about the terrible conditions
there. It may just be that when delivery is public, it is easier to get
the information about poor conditions.
Ultimately, responsibility in terms of accountability is pretty
clear. When a private school, or a private foster home, or some
private institution treats children badly, the social welfare agencies
are held accountable. So a lack of information is really the only
significant effect of privatization, in my experience with this.
QUESTION: Do any of the panelists have any thoughts as to
whether or not the accountability deficit with privatization is a byproduct, or actually a goal, of privatization? Perhaps the systems
are designed to disenfranchise some people who were beginning to
make gains through the old system, where we had rights, rules, and
regulations?
PROFESSOR STURM: I would not assume, simply because you
are moving in the direction of decentering, as opposed to eliminating regulatory oversight, that you necessarily are doing that for the
purpose of undermining the norm and disenfranchising people.
What we really need are criteria to evaluate when you have a
system that is creating possibilities for meaningful participation
and actual accountability. When you have a move that is essentially deregulating and moving away from any kind of public oversight or accountability, I think it is a mistake, at least in the areas
that I work in, to assume that the best way to handle complex
problems is the way we did it at the inception of the Civil Rights
Act.

140

One of the problems with advocacy in this field is that it has
been stuck somewhat. Now, that does not mean that you abandon
advocacy on behalf of service recipients when government con140. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1991).
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tracts-out to the private market. Instead we have to start thinking
more creatively about when to scream like hell when it looks like
you are moving in the direction of just disenfranchising groups of
people and when to begin to collaborate because it looks like there
is the possibility of actually embodying meaningful change.
PROFESSOR TRUBEK: I want to emphasize the point that in
Legal Services, there are restrictions on certain kinds of lawsuits,
particularly those challenging welfare reform. Therefore, within the
particular legal context that some of you are interested in, there
are clearly more restrictions now on lawyers doing certain kinds of
advocacy, which contributed to the "stuckness" of that problem.
So I do not think you have to come up with an elaborate conspiracy theory to see that when we move to this new system, it is extremely important that people interested in the people who are
being affected, and more generally, in accountability, figure out
that they need to get information, hold providers accountable, and
seek the resources and the systems to do that.
The moves toward privatization and globalization were made
very rapidly and a lot of institutions were left behind. Certainly,
the law schools are way out of it, and many lawyers are way out of
it. One reason we lawyers are losing business is we have not figured out this new system, except those who went to work for the
accounting firms.
So we cannot sit back and say, "Oh, it will all just resolve itself
without any action or changing or looking at things differently."
So in that sense, I certainly agree with you that there is a need for
new accountability mechanisms that will require active participation. It is not just going to happen by itself. We found in Wisconsin that in health care we had to make those accountability
mechanisms; they would not have been there otherwise.
PROFESSOR BEERMANN: There are two reasons, one very
cynical and one only slightly cynical, to agree with the implication
of your question.
The first is that if you assume that privatization is a product of
private lobbying of government to give advantages to certain private groups, then from a public choice perspective, it is all a conspiracy to divert public money somewhere where the public is not
going to be able to see how it is spent.
The other thing is, though, that if one reason why private action
is preferable to government action is because it is cheaper, and it is
cheaper because there is less procedural protection and less labor
protection, then it would be a natural by-product of privatization
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that you would have less procedure and less labor protection. If
that is what is causing the cost differential between doing something government-wise and doing something privately, it seems
perfectly logical.
PROFESSOR BRIFFAULT: It is not quite clear that the older
system is itself a paragon of accountability. Maybe we are talking
about comparative accountabilities and basically how to make
things work better in particular cases.
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